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Journal Articles Mathematics of Operations Research Year : 2007

Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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Abstract

We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.

Dates and versions

hal-00487954 , version 1 (31-05-2010)

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Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala. Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2007, Vol.32,n°2, pp.413-424. ⟨10.1287/moor.1060.0248⟩. ⟨hal-00487954⟩
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