Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Olivier Gossner (1, 2, 3) , Tristan Tomala (4)

1 PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
2 MEDS, Northwestern University
3 PSE - Paris School of Economics
4 CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision

We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.

Keywords: stochastic process; min-max values; signals; entropy; repeated games; secret correlation

Domains: Economy and decision science

Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala. Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2007, Vol.32,n°2, pp.413-424. ⟨10.1287/moor.1060.0248⟩. ⟨hal-00487954⟩