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Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Abstract : We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Monday, May 31, 2010 - 4:01:45 PM
Last modification on : Friday, April 29, 2022 - 10:13:01 AM

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Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala. Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, 2007, Vol.32,n°2, pp.413-424. ⟨10.1287/moor.1060.0248⟩. ⟨hal-00487954⟩



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