Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Olivier Gossner (1, 2, 3) , Tristan Tomala (4)

1 PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
2 MEDS, Northwestern University
3 PSE - Paris School of Economics
4 CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision

We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.

Mots clés: stochastic process; min-max values; signals; entropy; repeated games; secret correlation

Domaines: Economie et sciences de la décision

Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala. Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2007, Vol.32,n°2, pp.413-424. ⟨10.1287/moor.1060.0248⟩. ⟨hal-00487954⟩