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Journal Articles Social Choice and Welfare Year : 2004

Majority vote following a debate

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Itzhak Gilboa
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Abstract

Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases (or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives.

Dates and versions

hal-00464932 , version 1 (18-03-2010)

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Nicolas Vieille, Itzhak Gilboa. Majority vote following a debate. Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, Vol.23,n°1, pp.115-125. ⟨10.1007/s00355-003-0243-9⟩. ⟨hal-00464932⟩

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