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Majority vote following a debate

Abstract : Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases (or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives.
keyword : Majority vote debate
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, March 18, 2010 - 2:26:38 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

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Nicolas Vieille, Itzhak Gilboa. Majority vote following a debate. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2004, Vol.23,n°1, pp.115-125. ⟨10.1007/s00355-003-0243-9⟩. ⟨hal-00464932⟩



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