Majority vote following a debate

Nicolas Vieille (1) , Itzhak Gilboa (2)

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
2 TAU - Tel Aviv University

Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases (or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives.

Mots clés: Majority vote; debate

Domaines: Economie et sciences de la décision

Nicolas Vieille, Itzhak Gilboa. Majority vote following a debate. Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, Vol.23,n°1, pp.115-125. ⟨10.1007/s00355-003-0243-9⟩. ⟨hal-00464932⟩