Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Preprints, Working Papers, ...

Updating Confidence in Beliefs

Abstract : This paper develops a belief update rule under ambiguity, motivated by the maxim: in the face of new information, retain those conditional beliefs in which you are more confident, and relinquish only those in which you have less confidence. We provide a preference-based axiomatisation, drawing on the account of confidence in beliefs developed in Hill (2013). The proposed rule constitutes a general framework of which several existing rules for multiple priors (Full Bayesian, Maximum Likelihood) are special cases, but avoids the problems that these rules have with updating on complete ignorance. Moreover, it can handle surprising and null events, such as crises or reasoning in games, recovering traditional approaches, such as conditional probability systems, as special cases.
Document type :
Preprints, Working Papers, ...
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, July 10, 2020 - 12:23:44 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, June 25, 2022 - 10:57:00 AM

Links full text




Brian Hill. Updating Confidence in Beliefs. 2019. ⟨hal-02896088⟩



Record views