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Article Dans Une Revue Mathematics of Operations Research Année : 2016

Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information

Résumé

We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs depend, while the non-informed player only observes his opponent's actions. We show the existence of a limit value as the time span between two consecutive stages vanishes; this value is characterized through an auxiliary optimization problem and as the solution of an Hamilton-Jacobi equation.

Dates et versions

hal-02058235 , version 1 (05-03-2019)

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Pierre Cardaliaguet, Catherine Rainer, Dinah Rosenberg, Nicolas Vieille. Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2016, 41 (1), pp.49-71. ⟨10.2139/ssrn.2344780⟩. ⟨hal-02058235⟩
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