Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Preprints, Working Papers, ...

Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information

Abstract : We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs depend, while the non-informed player only observes his opponent's actions. We show the existence of a limit value as the time span between two consecutive stages vanishes; this value is characterized through an auxiliary optimization problem and as the solution of an Hamilton-Jacobi equation.
Document type :
Preprints, Working Papers, ...
Complete list of metadatas
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, March 5, 2019 - 8:08:45 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, September 23, 2020 - 4:31:19 AM



Links full text



Pierre Cardaliaguet, Catherine Rainer, Dinah Rosenberg, Nicolas Vieille. Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information. 2013. ⟨hal-02058235⟩