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Multinational Banks and Supranational Supervision

Abstract : We study the supervision of multinational banks (MNBs), allowing for either national or supranational supervision. National supervision leads to insufficient monitoring of MNBs due to a coordination problem between supervisors. Supranational supervision can solve this problem and increase monitoring. However, this change has the unintended consequence of affecting the MNB's choice of foreign representation. MNBs may expand abroad using branches rather than subsidiaries, or abandon foreign expansion altogether. These changes completely neutralize the more intense monitoring that would otherwise occur with supranational supervision. Our paper provides insight into how the national boundaries of bank supervision interact with multinational banks.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, January 24, 2019 - 8:22:26 PM
Last modification on : Monday, August 24, 2020 - 2:32:15 PM




  • HAL Id : hal-01993365, version 1



Giacomo Calzolari, Gyongyi Loranth. Multinational Banks and Supranational Supervision. 2016. ⟨hal-01993365⟩



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