Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Preprints, Working Papers, ...

Optimal Supervisory Architecture and Financial Integration in a Banking Union

Abstract : Both in the United States and in the Euro Area, bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and central supervisors. I study a model in which local supervisors do not internalize as many externalities as a central supervisor. Local supervisors are more lenient, but banks also have weaker incentives to hide information from them. These two forces can make a joint supervisory architecture optimal, with more weight put on centralized supervision when cross-border externalities are larger. Conversely, more centralized supervision endogenously encourages banks to integrate more cross-border. Due to this complementarity, the economy can be trapped in an equilibrium with both too little central supervision and too little financial integration, when a superior equilibrium would be achievable.
Complete list of metadatas

https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01941516
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Saturday, December 1, 2018 - 1:40:13 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, December 11, 2019 - 1:28:10 PM

Licence


Copyright

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01941516, version 1

Collections

Citation

Jean-Edouard Colliard. Optimal Supervisory Architecture and Financial Integration in a Banking Union. 2017. ⟨hal-01941516⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

113