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CEO optimism and incentive compensation

Abstract : I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than their peers. These findings add to our understanding of the interplay between managerial biases and remuneration and show how sophisticated principals can take advantage of optimistic agents by appropriately adjusting their compensation contracts.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01097589
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Friday, December 19, 2014 - 11:42:45 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:32 AM

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Clemens A. Otto. CEO optimism and incentive compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, 2014, 114 (2), pp.366-404. ⟨10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.06.006⟩. ⟨hal-01097589⟩

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