https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01069192Lehrer, EhudEhudLehrerSchool of Mathematical Sciences [Tel Aviv] - Raymond and Beverly Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences - Tel Aviv University [Tel Aviv]Rosenberg, DinahDinahRosenbergGREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche ScientifiqueShmaya, EranEranShmayaKellogg School of Management - Northwestern UniversityGarbling of signals and outcome equivalenceHAL CCSD2013Incomplete informationInformation structureCorrelated equilibriumGarblingRobustness[SHS.ECO.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance/Economy and decision scienceHaldemann, Antoine2014-09-28 18:05:062022-06-25 10:55:002014-09-28 18:05:06enJournal articles10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.0051In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria. Two information structures are equivalent from the perspective of a modeler, if they induce the same equilibrium outcomes. We characterize the situations in which two information structures are equivalent in terms of natural transformations, called garblings, from one structure to another. We study the notion of 'being equivalent to' in relation with three equilibrium concepts: Nash equilibrium, agent normal-form correlated equilibrium and the belief invariant Bayesian solution.