Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence

Abstract : In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria. Two information structures are equivalent from the perspective of a modeler, if they induce the same equilibrium outcomes. We characterize the situations in which two information structures are equivalent in terms of natural transformations, called garblings, from one structure to another. We study the notion of 'being equivalent to' in relation with three equilibrium concepts: Nash equilibrium, agent normal-form correlated equilibrium and the belief invariant Bayesian solution.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2013, 81, pp.179-191. 〈10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.005〉
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Soumis le : dimanche 28 septembre 2014 - 18:05:06
Dernière modification le : lundi 29 janvier 2018 - 17:22:54




Ehud Lehrer, Dinah Rosenberg, Eran Shmaya. Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2013, 81, pp.179-191. 〈10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.005〉. 〈hal-01069192〉



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