Bottom-Up Corporate Governance

Abstract : This article empirically relates the internal organization of a firm with decision making quality and corporate performance. We call "independent from the CEO" a top executive who joined the firm before the current CEO was appointed. In a very robust way, firms with a smaller fraction of independent executives exhibit (1) a lower level of profitability and (2) lower shareholder returns following large acquisitions. These results are unaffected when we control for traditional governance measures such as board independence or other well-studied shareholder friendly provisions. One interpretation is that "independently minded" top ranking executives act as a counter-power imposing strong discipline on their CEO, even though they are formally under his authority.
Keywords : corporate governance
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Review of Finance, Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option D, 2012, 17 (1), pp.161-201. 〈10.1093/rof/rfs020〉
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01026127
Contributeur : Amaury Bouvet <>
Soumis le : samedi 19 juillet 2014 - 22:00:12
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:19:32

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Augustin Landier, Julien Sauvagnat, David Sraer, David Thesmar. Bottom-Up Corporate Governance. Review of Finance, Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option D, 2012, 17 (1), pp.161-201. 〈10.1093/rof/rfs020〉. 〈hal-01026127〉

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