Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games

Abstract : This paper considers a general model of repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We study belief-free communication equilibria (BFCE) defined as follows. Players communicate with a mediator who receives types and signals and recommends actions. A BFCE is a communication device such that all players have an incentive to play faithfully, irrespectively of their belief about the state. We characterize BFCE payoffs for any repeated game with incomplete information in terms of one-shot payoff functions, information, and signaling structure.
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Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, 2013, 38 (4), pp.617-637. 〈10.1287/moor.2013.0594〉
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Soumis le : samedi 19 juillet 2014 - 21:49:02
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:19:32

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Tristan Tomala. Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games. Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, 2013, 38 (4), pp.617-637. 〈10.1287/moor.2013.0594〉. 〈hal-01026126〉

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