Efficient purchaser incentive when dealing with suppliers implementing continuous improvement plans

Abstract : This paper presents incentive schemes in the framework of a collaborative purchasing cost reduction process with a supplier implementing a continuous improvement plan. Using a stochastic decision process formulation, we analyze the structure of the optimal policy and characterize its numerical robustness through numerical applications solved by dynamic programming. Then, we analyze two purchaser incentive schemes observed in practice. First, we describe some theoretical properties of the policies associated with these two schemes (schemes I and II) and show that these policies exhibit nonoptimal structures. Second, we estimate the quantitative loss for typical parameter values and, in particular, we show that for certain businesses this loss is significant. Then, we propose two easy-to-implement improvements (schemes III and IV), which result in near-optimal solutions and a significant impact on purchasing cost performances.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
International Transactions in Operational Research, Wiley, 2014, 21 (4), pp.673-701. 〈10.1111/itor.12059〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01025958
Contributeur : Amaury Bouvet <>
Soumis le : vendredi 18 juillet 2014 - 22:39:40
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:19:32

Lien texte intégral

Identifiants

Collections

Citation

Laoucine Kerbache, Christian Van Delft. Efficient purchaser incentive when dealing with suppliers implementing continuous improvement plans. International Transactions in Operational Research, Wiley, 2014, 21 (4), pp.673-701. 〈10.1111/itor.12059〉. 〈hal-01025958〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

167