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Les auditeurs financiers face aux conflits d'agence : une étude des déterminants des honoraires d'audit en France

Abstract : Considering the audit of financial statements as a mechanism that reduces information asymmetry, one can hypothesize that agency conflicts influence audit fees. Studying the audit fees paid by the SBF 250 listed firms, our results show : 1) the absence of a significant relationship between managerial ownership and audit fees ; 2) a curvilinear relation (inversed U shape) between controlling shareholders ownership and audit fees ; 3) a negative relation between family control and audit fees. These results outline the dominance of agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in France, unlike in Anglo-Saxon countries where the dominant conflict is between managers and shareholders. The study permits to draw practical implications for practitioners and regulators.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00853061
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, August 21, 2013 - 4:38:39 PM
Last modification on : Monday, March 11, 2019 - 2:32:04 PM

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Cédric Lesage, Chiraz Ben Ali. Les auditeurs financiers face aux conflits d'agence : une étude des déterminants des honoraires d'audit en France. Comptabilité - Contrôle - Audit, Association Francophone de Comptabilité ; Vuibert, 2013, 19 (1), pp.59-89. ⟨10.3917/cca.191.0059⟩. ⟨hal-00853061⟩

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