Dynamic sender-receiver games

Abstract : We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.
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Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2013, 148 (2), pp.502-534. 〈10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.006〉
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Contributeur : Amaury Bouvet <>
Soumis le : dimanche 24 mars 2013 - 15:51:30
Dernière modification le : jeudi 6 septembre 2018 - 10:10:04

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Nicolas Vieille, Eilon Solan, Jérôme Renault. Dynamic sender-receiver games. Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2013, 148 (2), pp.502-534. 〈10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.006〉. 〈hal-00804028〉

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