Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard

Abstract : The economic analysis of tort law is extended to multi-party accidents with unobservable actions. Due to the requirement of no punitive damages, the problem resembles a team production problem. It is shown that asymmetry in the agents' impact on the stochastic damage function can be exploited to improve ex ante incentives. This implies departures from the proportional rule, based on the statistical information contained in the circumstances of the accident. If a noisy monitoring technology is introduced, then monitoring can add enough stochastic identifiability among injurers to restore efficiency.
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Article dans une revue
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Mohr Siebeck, 1998, vol. 154, n° 2, pp. 422-450
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Soumis le : dimanche 2 décembre 2012 - 17:21:43
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:19:31

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Ulrich Hege, Eberhard Feess. Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Mohr Siebeck, 1998, vol. 154, n° 2, pp. 422-450. 〈hal-00759758〉

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