Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility

Abstract : Firms will exert too little care due to a limited liability effect if damages are likely to exceed their equity. This is particularly important for environmental and product liability and motivates the current discussion about mandatory insurance and extending liability to creditors. We model the choice of the care level as a moral hazard problem that can be solved through costly monitoring. Conventional strict liability and lender liability both lead to distortions in the capital structure and to inefficiently low care. By contrast, mandatory liability coverage (financial responsibility) that can be satisfied by either an insurance contract or a lender guarantee leads to the first best allocation if managers can self-insure, and to the second best if managers cannot self-insure but choose to be monitored.
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Article dans une revue
Geneva Papers for Risk and Insurance. Issues and Practice, 2000, vol. 25, n° 2, pp. 203-217
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Soumis le : dimanche 2 décembre 2012 - 17:04:40
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:19:31

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  • HAL Id : hal-00759748, version 1

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Ulrich Hege, Eberhard Feess. Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility. Geneva Papers for Risk and Insurance. Issues and Practice, 2000, vol. 25, n° 2, pp. 203-217. 〈hal-00759748〉

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