Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense Be Common Knowledge?

Abstract : This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.
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Economics Letters, Elsevier, 1988, vol. 27, issue 3, pp. 215-221. 〈10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5〉
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Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler. Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense Be Common Knowledge?. Economics Letters, Elsevier, 1988, vol. 27, issue 3, pp. 215-221. 〈10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5〉. 〈hal-00753242〉

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