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Journal articles
Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense Be Common Knowledge?
Abstract : This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.
https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00753242
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Sunday, November 18, 2012 - 9:49:29 PM
Last modification on : Sunday, November 18, 2012 - 9:49:59 PM
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Sunday, November 18, 2012 - 9:49:29 PM
Last modification on : Sunday, November 18, 2012 - 9:49:59 PM
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