Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense Be Common Knowledge?

Itzhak Gilboa (1) , David Schmeidler (2)

1 TAU - Tel Aviv University
2 OSU - Ohio State University [Columbus]

This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.

Mots clés: Information Dependent Games; Common Sense; Common Knowledge

Domaines: Economie et sciences de la décision

Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler. Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense Be Common Knowledge?. Economics Letters, 1988, vol. 27, issue 3, pp. 215-221. ⟨10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5⟩. ⟨hal-00753242⟩