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Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense Be Common Knowledge?

Itzhak Gilboa 1 David Schmeidler 2
1 Tel Aviv University [Tel Aviv]
2 OSU - Ohio State University [Columbus]
Abstract : This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.
Keywords : Information Dependent Games Common Sense Common Knowledge
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Sunday, November 18, 2012 - 9:49:29 PM
Last modification on : Sunday, November 18, 2012 - 9:49:59 PM

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Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler. Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense Be Common Knowledge?. Economics Letters, Elsevier, 1988, vol. 27, issue 3, pp. 215-221. ⟨10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5⟩. ⟨hal-00753242⟩

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