Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Bounded Versus Unbounded Rationality: The Tyranny of the Weak

Abstract : We examine the case of a two-person repeated game played by a boundedly rational player versus an unboundedly rational opponent. The former is restricted to strategies which are implementable by connected finite automata. It is shown that the "rational" player has a dominant strategy, and that in some cases the "weaker" (boundedly rational) player may exploit this fact to "blackmail" him. It is also shown that for a repeated zero-sum game, the rational player has a strategy which drives the automaton player's limit payoff down to his security (maxmin) level, even if he may choose any finite automaton.
Complete list of metadatas

https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00753239
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Sunday, November 18, 2012 - 8:54:13 PM
Last modification on : Sunday, November 18, 2012 - 8:54:40 PM

Links full text

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Itzhak Gilboa, Dov Samet. Bounded Versus Unbounded Rationality: The Tyranny of the Weak. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 1989, vol. 1, pp. 213-221. ⟨10.1016/0899-8256(89)90009-2⟩. ⟨hal-00753239⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

490