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Journal Articles Games and Economic Behavior Year : 2003

Expected Utility in the Context of a Game

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D. Schmeidler
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Abstract

A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each probability distribution over the state of the world (nature's strategies), she has a weak order over her acts (pure strategies).We formulate conditions on these weak orders guaranteeing that they can be jointly represented by expected utility maximization with respect to an almost-unique state-dependent utility, that is, a matrix assigning real numbers to act-state pairs. As opposed to a utility function that is derived in another context, the utility matrix derived in the game will incorporate all psychological or sociological determinants of well-being that result from the very fact that the outcomes are obtained in a given game.

Dates and versions

hal-00752136 , version 1 (14-11-2012)

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Itzhak Gilboa, D. Schmeidler. Expected Utility in the Context of a Game. Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 44, pp. 184-194. ⟨10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00015-0⟩. ⟨hal-00752136⟩

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