Expected Utility in the Context of a Game

Abstract : A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each probability distribution over the state of the world (nature's strategies), she has a weak order over her acts (pure strategies).We formulate conditions on these weak orders guaranteeing that they can be jointly represented by expected utility maximization with respect to an almost-unique state-dependent utility, that is, a matrix assigning real numbers to act-state pairs. As opposed to a utility function that is derived in another context, the utility matrix derived in the game will incorporate all psychological or sociological determinants of well-being that result from the very fact that the outcomes are obtained in a given game.
Keywords : Expected Utility Game
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Article dans une revue
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2003, vol. 44, pp. 184-194. 〈10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00015-0〉
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Contributeur : Amaury Bouvet <>
Soumis le : mercredi 14 novembre 2012 - 23:31:42
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:19:31

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Itzhak Gilboa, D. Schmeidler. Expected Utility in the Context of a Game. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2003, vol. 44, pp. 184-194. 〈10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00015-0〉. 〈hal-00752136〉

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