Making statements and approval voting

Itzhak Gilboa (1) , Enriqueta Aragones , Andrew Weiss (2)

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
2 Department of Economics

We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.

Keywords: Approval voting; Turnout

Domains: Humanities and Social Sciences; Economics and Finance; Economy and decision science

Itzhak Gilboa, Enriqueta Aragones, Andrew Weiss. Making statements and approval voting. Theory and Decision, 2011, 71 (4), pp.461-472. ⟨10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5⟩. ⟨hal-00745602⟩