Making statements and approval voting

Abstract : We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2011, 71 (4), pp.461-472. 〈10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5〉
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Soumis le : jeudi 25 octobre 2012 - 21:24:24
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:19:31

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Itzhak Gilboa, Enriqueta Aragones, Andrew Weiss. Making statements and approval voting. Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2011, 71 (4), pp.461-472. 〈10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5〉. 〈hal-00745602〉



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