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Making statements and approval voting

Abstract : We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, October 25, 2012 - 9:24:24 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

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Itzhak Gilboa, Enriqueta Aragones, Andrew Weiss. Making statements and approval voting. Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2011, 71 (4), pp.461-472. ⟨10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5⟩. ⟨hal-00745602⟩



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