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Journal Articles Games and Economic Behavior Year : 2012

Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

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Yuval Heller
  • Function : Author
Eilon Solan
  • Function : Author

Abstract

This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

Dates and versions

hal-00715606 , version 1 (08-07-2012)

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Tristan Tomala, Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan. Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 74 (1), pp.222-234. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002⟩. ⟨hal-00715606⟩

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