Abstract : This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.
https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00715606
Contributeur : Amaury Bouvet
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Soumis le : dimanche 8 juillet 2012 - 19:28:54
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:19:31
Tristan Tomala, Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan. Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2012, 74 (1), pp.222-234. 〈10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002〉. 〈hal-00715606〉
