Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Tristan Tomala (1) , Yuval Heller , Eilon Solan

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC

This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

Keywords: Cheap-talk; Communication equilibrium; Normal-form correlated equilibrium; Distributed computation

Domains: Humanities and Social Sciences; Economics and Finance; Economy and decision science

Tristan Tomala, Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan. Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 74 (1), pp.222-234. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002⟩. ⟨hal-00715606⟩