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Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Tristan Tomala 1 Yuval Heller Eilon Solan
1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
Abstract : This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.
Keywords : Cheap-talk Communication equilibrium Normal-form correlated equilibrium Distributed computation
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00715606
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Sunday, July 8, 2012 - 7:28:54 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

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Tristan Tomala, Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan. Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2012, 74 (1), pp.222-234. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002⟩. ⟨hal-00715606⟩

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