Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Ownership, Organization, and Private Firm's efficient use of resources

Abstract : The principal-agent theory asserts that public firms' performance is driven by efficient capital and labor markets but is silent about non-listed private companies, which are less permeable to market forces (both capital and labor) than are public companies. We propose and test a 2 x 2 framework distinguishing owner-controlled vs. agent-led firms from firms with a flat vs. multilayer organization. Our findings provide highly contrasted results and raise important issues for further study of private firms.
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Sunday, May 20, 2012 - 3:23:39 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, June 25, 2022 - 10:53:36 AM

Links full text





Rodolphe Durand, Vicente Vargas. Ownership, Organization, and Private Firm's efficient use of resources. Strategic Management Journal, Wiley, 2003, vol. 23, n° 7, pp. 667-676. ⟨10.1002/smj.321⟩. ⟨hal-00699294⟩



Record views