Ownership, Organization, and Private Firm's efficient use of resources

Abstract : The principal-agent theory asserts that public firms' performance is driven by efficient capital and labor markets but is silent about non-listed private companies, which are less permeable to market forces (both capital and labor) than are public companies. We propose and test a 2 x 2 framework distinguishing owner-controlled vs. agent-led firms from firms with a flat vs. multilayer organization. Our findings provide highly contrasted results and raise important issues for further study of private firms.
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Strategic Management Journal, Wiley, 2003, vol. 23, n° 7, pp. 667-676. 〈10.1002/smj.321〉
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Soumis le : dimanche 20 mai 2012 - 15:23:39
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:19:32

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Rodolphe Durand, Vicente Vargas. Ownership, Organization, and Private Firm's efficient use of resources. Strategic Management Journal, Wiley, 2003, vol. 23, n° 7, pp. 667-676. 〈10.1002/smj.321〉. 〈hal-00699294〉

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