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Journal Articles Strategic Management Journal Year : 2003

Ownership, Organization, and Private Firm's efficient use of resources

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Abstract

The principal-agent theory asserts that public firms' performance is driven by efficient capital and labor markets but is silent about non-listed private companies, which are less permeable to market forces (both capital and labor) than are public companies. We propose and test a 2 x 2 framework distinguishing owner-controlled vs. agent-led firms from firms with a flat vs. multilayer organization. Our findings provide highly contrasted results and raise important issues for further study of private firms.

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hal-00699294 , version 1 (20-05-2012)

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Rodolphe Durand, Vicente Vargas. Ownership, Organization, and Private Firm's efficient use of resources. Strategic Management Journal, 2003, vol. 23, n° 7, pp. 667-676. ⟨10.1002/smj.321⟩. ⟨hal-00699294⟩

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