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Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence

Abstract : We generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009) [15] to N-player games with arbitrary information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under low discounting as the set of feasible payoffs that are individually rational, jointly rational, and incentive compatible. Second, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00630299
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Saturday, October 8, 2011 - 4:14:10 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

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Stefano Lovo, Johannes Hörner, Tristan Tomala. Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence. Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2011, 146 (5), pp.1770-1795. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.001⟩. ⟨hal-00630299⟩

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