Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence

Stefano Lovo (1) , Johannes Hörner (2) , Tristan Tomala (1)

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
2 Department of Economics

We generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009) [15] to N-player games with arbitrary information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under low discounting as the set of feasible payoffs that are individually rational, jointly rational, and incentive compatible. Second, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty.

Keywords: Repeated game with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; Belief-free equilibria

Domains: Humanities and Social Sciences; Economics and Finance; Economy and decision science; Humanities and Social Sciences; Business administration

Stefano Lovo, Johannes Hörner, Tristan Tomala. Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence. Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146 (5), pp.1770-1795. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.001⟩. ⟨hal-00630299⟩