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Journal articles
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence
Abstract : We generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009) [15] to N-player games with arbitrary information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under low discounting as the set of feasible payoffs that are individually rational, jointly rational, and incentive compatible. Second, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty.
https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00630299
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Saturday, October 8, 2011 - 4:14:10 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Saturday, October 8, 2011 - 4:14:10 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM
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