Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation

Optimal Debt Exchange Offers

Abstract : This paper examines the pricing and efficiency implications of debt exchange offers. The continuous-time model employed yields simple asset pricing formulae as well as closed-form solutions for the parameters characterising optimal debt exchanges offers. Polar cases are examined in which the debt is either held by a single bank or by many bond-holders, that is respectively private or public debt. A comparative analysis of the efficiency properties of each form of debt yields the interesting finding that under the often criticised exit-consent provision, optimal public debt exchange offers are ex-ante the most efficient.
Document type :
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Saturday, July 9, 2011 - 2:25:56 PM
Last modification on : Friday, September 16, 2016 - 3:21:10 PM


  • HAL Id : hal-00607533, version 1



Pierre Mella-Barral. Optimal Debt Exchange Offers. 1995. ⟨hal-00607533⟩



Record views