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Nash-walras Equilibria of a Large Economy

Abstract : Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash - walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utility functions are not quasi - concave and choice sets are not convex, which is the case in standard settings; the separation of the purchase from the sale of contracts and the pooling of the deliveries on contracts guarantee that the markets for commodities clear.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00601580
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Sunday, June 19, 2011 - 2:31:13 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, September 10, 2020 - 3:42:50 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00601580, version 1

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Enrico Minelli, Heracles M. Polemarchakis. Nash-walras Equilibria of a Large Economy. 1999. ⟨hal-00601580⟩

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