A Comparison of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions with Synergies

Stefano Lovo (1) , Gian Luigi Albano (2) , Fabrizio Germano (3)

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
2 Department of Economics
3 Eitan Berglas School of Economics

In an example where some bidders have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions.

Mots clés: Ascending auctions; Multi-unit auctions; Complementarities

Stefano Lovo, Gian Luigi Albano, Fabrizio Germano. A Comparison of Standard Multi-Unit Auctions with Synergies. 1999. ⟨hal-00599418⟩