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Performance des grands groupes et stratégies de rétribution des dirigeants

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Abstract

In today's managerial world (corporate governance, shareholders' wealth maximization, agency theory) how are CEOs paid in the 700 layest French firms ? What are the various components of total compensation: fixed camp, bonus fringes, stock options ? What parties influence the mix and amounts : board, compensation committee, CEO himself, etc. ? On what criteria is CEOs' compensation based : objective / subjective criteria, short term / medium term, etc. ? What ratio between the various layers of employees from CEO to workers? How and where are CEOs recruited ? These are the major questions to which we produce answers. We also tests various theories like tournament or compensation as a key element of social status.
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Dates and versions

hal-00598906 , version 1 (07-06-2011)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00598906 , version 1

Cite

Georges Trepo, Patrice Roussel. Performance des grands groupes et stratégies de rétribution des dirigeants. 1999. ⟨hal-00598906⟩
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