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Performance des grands groupes et stratégies de rétribution des dirigeants

Abstract

In today's managerial world (corporate governance, shareholders' wealth maximization, agency theory) how are CEOs paid in the 700 layest French firms ? What are the various components of total compensation: fixed camp, bonus fringes, stock options ? What parties influence the mix and amounts : board, compensation committee, CEO himself, etc. ? On what criteria is CEOs' compensation based : objective / subjective criteria, short term / medium term, etc. ? What ratio between the various layers of employees from CEO to workers? How and where are CEOs recruited ? These are the major questions to which we produce answers. We also tests various theories like tournament or compensation as a key element of social status.
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Dates and versions

hal-00598906 , version 1 (07-06-2011)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00598906 , version 1

Cite

Georges Trepo, Patrice Roussel. Performance des grands groupes et stratégies de rétribution des dirigeants. 1999. ⟨hal-00598906⟩
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