Delegation and coordination in fiscal monetary policy games: Implementation of the best feasible equilibrium - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
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Delegation and coordination in fiscal monetary policy games: Implementation of the best feasible equilibrium

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Florin Bilbiie
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hal-00597244 , version 1 (31-05-2011)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00597244 , version 1

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Florin Bilbiie. Delegation and coordination in fiscal monetary policy games: Implementation of the best feasible equilibrium. 2001. ⟨hal-00597244⟩

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