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Delegation and coordination in fiscal monetary policy games: Implementation of the best feasible equilibrium

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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00597244
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Tuesday, May 31, 2011 - 2:15:55 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, June 25, 2022 - 10:52:03 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00597244, version 1

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Florin Bilbiie. Delegation and coordination in fiscal monetary policy games: Implementation of the best feasible equilibrium. 2001. ⟨hal-00597244⟩

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