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Continua of Underemployment Equilibria Reflecting Coordination Failures, Also at Walrasian Prices

Abstract : In this paper the existence of unemployment is partly explained as being the result of coordination failures. It is shown that as a result of self-fulfilling pessimistic expectations, even at Walrasian prices, a continuum of equilibria results, among which an equilibrium with approximately no trade and a Walrasian equilibrium. These coordination failures also arise at other price systems, but then unemployment is the result of both a wrong price system and coordination failures. Some properties of the set of equilibria are analyzed. Generically, there exists a continuum of non-indifferent equilibrium allocations. Under a condition implied by gross substitutability, there exists a continuum of equilibrium allocations in the neighborhood of a competitive allocation, when prices are Walrasian. For a specialized economy, a dynamic illustration is offered.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00597197
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, May 31, 2011 - 1:16:30 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, April 15, 2020 - 9:56:12 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00597197, version 1

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Alessandro Citanna, Hervé Crès, Jacques H. Drèze, Jean-Jacques Herings, Antonio Villanacci. Continua of Underemployment Equilibria Reflecting Coordination Failures, Also at Walrasian Prices. 2001. ⟨hal-00597197⟩

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