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Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets

Abstract : An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at p-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most p x 100 percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a p-majority stable equilibrium exists provided that p > (S - J) / (S - J + 1') where S is the number of states at the last date, J is the number of firms and B is the dimensions of the sets of efficient production plans for firms. Moreover, an example shows that p majority stable equilibria need not exist for smaller p's.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00597193
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, May 31, 2011 - 1:09:21 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, January 22, 2020 - 10:20:03 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00597193, version 1

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Hervé Crès, Mich Tvede. Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets. 2001. ⟨hal-00597193⟩

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