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De l'impact de la microstructure d'un marché de permis de polluer sur la politique environnementale

Abstract : This paper investigates the relation between the optimal amount of pollution permits issued by an environmental agency and the mechanisms used to trade these permits in the "secondary market".We show that when permits are traded using a quote-driven mechanism, the total amount of permits to be allocated by the environmental agency depends on two factors: (i) the market structure of intermediaries (i.e. monopolist market maker or competitive market makers); (ii) the presence of uncertainty about the production functions of the polluters.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00597024
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Monday, May 30, 2011 - 8:34:07 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, October 14, 2020 - 4:01:37 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00597024, version 1

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Marc Germain, Stefano Lovo, Vincent van Steenberghe. De l'impact de la microstructure d'un marché de permis de polluer sur la politique environnementale. 2001. ⟨hal-00597024⟩

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