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On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects

Abstract : We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects: the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) and the the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We first derive a (competitive) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the JAMO by exploiting the strategic equivalence between the JAMO and the Survival Auction which consists of a finite sequence of sealed-bid auctions. Then, we prove that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO do not have a counterpart in the JAMO. However, it is shown that certain collusive equilibria based on retaliatory strategies do exist in both auctions.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00593867
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, May 17, 2011 - 7:38:22 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:32 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00593867, version 1

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Stefano Lovo, Gian Luigi Albano, Fabrizio Germano. On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects. 2002. ⟨hal-00593867⟩

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