On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects

Stefano Lovo (1) , Gian Luigi Albano , Fabrizio Germano

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC

We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects: the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) and the the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We first derive a (competitive) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the JAMO by exploiting the strategic equivalence between the JAMO and the Survival Auction which consists of a finite sequence of sealed-bid auctions. Then, we prove that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO do not have a counterpart in the JAMO. However, it is shown that certain collusive equilibria based on retaliatory strategies do exist in both auctions.

Keywords: Multi-unit auctions; Ascending auctions; FCC auctions; Collusion; Retaliation.; Retaliation

Stefano Lovo, Gian Luigi Albano, Fabrizio Germano. On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects. 2002. ⟨hal-00593867⟩