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Random Walks and Voting Theory

Abstract : Voters' preferences depend on available information. Following Case-Based Decision Theory, we assume that this information is processed additively. We prove that the collective preferences deduced from the individual ones through majority vote cannot be arbitrary, as soon as a winning quota is required. The proof is based on a new result on random walks.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00593650
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Monday, May 16, 2011 - 8:09:44 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:32 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00593650, version 1

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Nicolas Vieille. Random Walks and Voting Theory. 2002. ⟨hal-00593650⟩

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