Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Reports

Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems

Abstract : Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness in a class of such games, namely infinitely repeated decision problems with discounting. The condition is two-fold: the range of possible utility levels in the decision problem should be bounded from below, and the discount factor between successive periods should be non-decreasing over time, a condition met by exponential, quasi-exponential and hyperbolic discounting.
Complete list of metadatas

https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00593648
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Monday, May 16, 2011 - 8:05:21 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:32 AM

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00593648, version 1

Collections

Citation

Nicolas Vieille, Jörgen Weibull. Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems. 2002. ⟨hal-00593648⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

134