Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation

Linkage Principle, Multi-dimensional Signals and Blind Auctions

Abstract : We compare the seller's expected revenue in a second price sealed bid auction for a single object in which bidders receive multidimensional signals. Bidders' valuations for the object depend on their signals and a signal observed privately by the seller. We show in various examples that the seller can be better off not revealing publicly his signal. Hence the linkage principle does not necessarily hold when bidders receive multidimensional signals.
Document type :
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Tuesday, May 10, 2011 - 5:29:36 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:32 AM


  • HAL Id : hal-00592018, version 1



Stefano Lovo, Thierry Foucault. Linkage Principle, Multi-dimensional Signals and Blind Auctions. 2011. ⟨hal-00592018⟩



Les métriques sont temporairement indisponibles