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Continuous-Time Games of Timing

Abstract : We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games of complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e > 0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00591682
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Monday, May 9, 2011 - 10:31:30 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, November 21, 2019 - 3:32:07 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00591682, version 1

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Citation

Rida Laraki, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille. Continuous-Time Games of Timing. 2003. ⟨hal-00591682⟩

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