Continuous-Time Games of Timing

Rida Laraki (1) , Eilon Solan (2, 3) , Nicolas Vieille (4)

1 X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique
2 TAU - School of Mathematical Sciences [Tel Aviv]
3 MEDS, Northwestern University
4 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC

We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games of complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e > 0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.

Keywords: Timing games; Continuous-time games; Games of timing; War of attrition; Preemption games

Domains: Economy and decision science

Rida Laraki, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille. Continuous-Time Games of Timing. 2003. ⟨hal-00591682⟩