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Towards a "sophisticated" model of belief dynamics

Abstract : It is well-known that classical models of belief are not realistic representations of human doxastic capacity; equally, models of actions involving beliefs, such as decisions based on beliefs, or changes of beliefs, suffer from similar inaccuracies. In this paper, a general framework is presented which permits a more realistic modelling both of instantaneous states of belief, and of the operations involving them. This framework is motivated by the inadequacies of existing models, which it overcomes, whilst retaining technical rigour in so far as it relies on known, natural logical and mathematical notions. As an illustration of this framework, it will be applied to the particular case of belief revision. A model of belief revision shall be obtained which, rstly, recovers the Gärdenfors postulates in a well-speci ed, natural yet simple class of particular circumstances; secondly, can accommodate iterated revisions, recovering several proposed revision operators for iterated revision as special cases; and nally, offers an analysis of Rott's recent counterexample to several Gärdenfors postulates [23], elucidating in what sense it fails to be one of the special cases to which these postulates apply.
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Sunday, April 3, 2011 - 3:43:36 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, June 25, 2022 - 10:51:53 AM


  • HAL Id : hal-00582664, version 1




Brian Hill. Towards a "sophisticated" model of belief dynamics. 2006. ⟨hal-00582664⟩



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