Finitely repeated games with semi-standard

Tristan Tomala (1) , Pauline Contou-Carrère (2)

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
2 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne

This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases.

Keywords: Finitely repeated games; Semi-standard monitoring; Folk Theorem

Domains: Economy and decision science

Tristan Tomala, Pauline Contou-Carrère. Finitely repeated games with semi-standard. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47 (1), pp.14-21. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.10.005⟩. ⟨hal-00580938⟩