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Finitely repeated games with semi-standard

Abstract : This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00580938
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, March 29, 2011 - 4:55:02 PM
Last modification on : Sunday, January 19, 2020 - 6:38:25 PM

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Tristan Tomala, Pauline Contou-Carrère. Finitely repeated games with semi-standard. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2011, 47 (1), pp.14-21. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.10.005⟩. ⟨hal-00580938⟩

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