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Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information

Abstract : We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00580152
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Saturday, March 26, 2011 - 5:04:38 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:32 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00580152, version 1

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Stefano Lovo, Johannes Hörner. Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information. 2007. ⟨hal-00580152⟩

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