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La théorie de la décision et la psychologie du sens commun

Abstract : Taking the philosophical standpoint, this article compares the mathematical theory of individual decision-making with the folk psychology conception of action, desire and belief. It narrows down its topic by carrying the comparison vis-à-vis Savage's system and its technical concept of subjective probability, which is referred to the basic model of betting as in Ramsey. The argument is organized around three philosophical theses: (i) decision theory is nothing but folk psychology stated in formal language (Lewis), (ii) the former substantially improves on the latter, but is unable to overcome its typical limitations, especially its failure to separate desire and belief empirically (Davidson), (iii) the former substantially improves on the latter, and through these innovations, overcomes some of the limitations. The aim of the article is to establish (iii) not only against the all too simple thesis (i), but also against the subtle thesis (ii).
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00579359
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, March 23, 2011 - 3:46:40 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:32 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00579359, version 1

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Philippe Mongin. La théorie de la décision et la psychologie du sens commun. 2011. ⟨hal-00579359⟩

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