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A strong paradox of multiple elections

Abstract : We consider a stronger version of the paradox of multiple elections and show that it is possible that not only the winning combination of propositions, but also all the combinations sufficiently close to it, receive zero votes.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00541791
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, December 1, 2010 - 11:31:45 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

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Marco Scarsini. A strong paradox of multiple elections. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 1998, Vol. 15, N°2, pp. 237-238. ⟨10.1007/s003550050102⟩. ⟨hal-00541791⟩

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