A strong paradox of multiple elections

Marco Scarsini (1, 2)

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
2 dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica

We consider a stronger version of the paradox of multiple elections and show that it is possible that not only the winning combination of propositions, but also all the combinations sufficiently close to it, receive zero votes.

Mots clés: Paradox; multiple elections; voting

Domaines: Economie et sciences de la décision

Marco Scarsini. A strong paradox of multiple elections. Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, Vol. 15, N°2, pp. 237-238. ⟨10.1007/s003550050102⟩. ⟨hal-00541791⟩