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Journal articles
Sequential decisions with several agents
Abstract : We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents, maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given.
Mots-clés :
sequential decisions
agents
https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00541747
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, December 1, 2010 - 10:09:33 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, December 1, 2010 - 10:09:33 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM