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Journal Articles Economic Theory Year : 1998

Sequential decisions with several agents

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Abstract

We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents, maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given.
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hal-00541747 , version 1 (01-12-2010)

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Marco Scarsini, Bruno Bassan. Sequential decisions with several agents. Economic Theory, 1998, Vol. 12, N°2, pp. 371-391. ⟨10.2307/25055128⟩. ⟨hal-00541747⟩

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