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The newsvendor game has a non-empty core

Marco Scarsini 1, 2 Alfred Muller Moshe Shaked
1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
2 Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali
Abstract : We settle an open conjecture regarding the newsvendor game. We prove that its core is always non-empty, for all possible joint distributions of the random demands. We give sufficient conditions under which the core is a singleton or it contains non-negative elements.
keyword : cost allocation inventory centralization core
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00539841
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Thursday, November 25, 2010 - 11:56:14 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

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Marco Scarsini, Alfred Muller, Moshe Shaked. The newsvendor game has a non-empty core. Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour, 2002, Vol. 38, N°1, pp. 118-126. ⟨10.1006/game.2001.0854⟩. ⟨hal-00539841⟩

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