The newsvendor game has a non-empty core

Marco Scarsini (1, 2) , Alfred Muller , Moshe Shaked

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
2 Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali

We settle an open conjecture regarding the newsvendor game. We prove that its core is always non-empty, for all possible joint distributions of the random demands. We give sufficient conditions under which the core is a singleton or it contains non-negative elements.

Keywords: cost allocation; inventory centralization; core

Domains: Humanities and Social Sciences; Economics and Finance; Economy and decision science

Marco Scarsini, Alfred Muller, Moshe Shaked. The newsvendor game has a non-empty core. Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour, 2002, Vol. 38, N°1, pp. 118-126. ⟨10.1006/game.2001.0854⟩. ⟨hal-00539841⟩