HAL will be down for maintenance from Friday, June 10 at 4pm through Monday, June 13 at 9am. More information
Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Positive value of information in games

Abstract : We exhibit a general class of interactive decision situations in which all the agents benefit from more information. This class includes as a special case the classical comparison of statistical experiments `a la Blackwell. More specifically, we consider pairs consisting of a game with incomplete information G and an information structure S such that the extended game (G,S) has a unique Pareto payoff profile u. We prove that u is a Nash payoff profile of (G,S), and that for any information structure T that is coarser than S, all Nash payoff profiles of (G,S) are dominated by u. We then prove that our condition is also necessary in the following sense: Given any convex compact polyhedron of payoff profiles, whose Pareto frontier is not a singleton, there exists an extended game (G,S) with that polyhedron as the convex hull of feasible payoffs, an information structure T coarser than S and a player i who strictly prefers a Nash equilibrium in (G,S) to any Nash equilibrium in (G,S).
Complete list of metadata

Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, November 25, 2010 - 10:55:05 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, January 18, 2022 - 2:16:01 PM

Links full text



Marco Scarsini, Bruno Bassan, Olivier Gossner, Shmuel Zamir. Positive value of information in games. International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, 2003, Vol. 32, pp. 17-31. ⟨10.1007/s001820300142⟩. ⟨hal-00539798⟩



Record views