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A Note on the Evaluation of Information in Zero-Sum Repeated Games

Abstract : Two players play a zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information. Before the game starts one player receives a private signal that depends on the realized state of nature. The rules that govern the choice of the signal are determined by the information structure of the game. Different information structures induce different values. The value-of-information function of a game associates every information structure with the value it induces. We characterize those functions that are value-of-information functions for some zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00537092
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, November 17, 2010 - 3:55:53 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

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Dinah Rosenberg, Ehud Lehrer. A Note on the Evaluation of Information in Zero-Sum Repeated Games. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2010, 46 (4), pp.393-399. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.02.002⟩. ⟨hal-00537092⟩

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