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Signaling and mediation in games with common interest

Abstract : Players who have a common interest are engaged in a game with incomplete information. Before playing they get differential stochastic signals that depend on the actual state of nature. These signals provide the players with partial information about the state of nature and may also serve as a means of correlation. Different information structures induce different outcomes. An information structure is better than another, with respect to a certain solution concept, if the highest solution payoff it induces is at least that induced by the other structure. This paper characterizes the situation where one information structure is better than another with respect to various solution concepts: Nash equilibrium, strategic-normal-form correlated equilibrium, agent-normal-form correlated equilibrium and belief-invariant Bayesian solution. These solution concepts differ from one another in the scope of communication allowed between the players. The characterizations use maps that stochastically translate signals of one structure to signals of another.
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Thursday, October 21, 2010 - 4:32:09 PM
Last modification on : Monday, January 29, 2018 - 5:22:54 PM

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Dinah Rosenberg, Ehud Lehrer, Eran Shmaya. Signaling and mediation in games with common interest. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2010, 68 (2), pp.670-682. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.007⟩. ⟨hal-00528396⟩

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