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Reports Year : 2010

Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries

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Abstract

We test whether the …firm's systematic equity risk reflects the shareholders' incentives to default strategically on the …firm's debt. We use a real options model to relate the shareholders' strategic default behavior to frictions in the debt renegotiation procedure. We test the model's predictions with an international cross-section of stocks, exploiting the exogenous cross-country variation of bankruptcy procedures. We …find that the equity beta increases as debt is more strictly enforced. Moreover, the equity beta decreases with liquidation costs and shareholders' bargaining power, and the sensitivity of this relation weakens as the country's debt renegotiation procedures become more creditor friendly.
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Dates and versions

hal-00515919 , version 1 (08-09-2010)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00515919 , version 1

Cite

Philip Valta, Giovanni Favara, Enrique Schroth. Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries. 2010. ⟨hal-00515919⟩

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